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PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD

December 18, 1952

MEMORANDUM:

TO : Members of PSB Ad Hoc Panel "F"

SUBJECT : Draft Plan for Berlin

1. Your Working Group* has completed its drafting of A National Psychological Strategy with respect to Berlin, and copies are enclosed for your comments and for working-level clearance within your Department or Agency.

2. It would be appreciated if you would submit your suggestions for revision to my office (~~1201, Ext. 2226~~ ^{25X1A} 1201, Ext. 2226) next week. If there are no serious differences of opinion among the Departments and Agencies involved, your revisions will be incorporated into another Draft which will be forwarded to the Director of PSB for presentation to the Board members. At that time, a final top-level Departmental and Agency clearance of that Draft will be in order, prior to Board action at its January 15th meeting.

3. If further discussion of the enclosed Draft is necessary, a full Panel meeting will be called for the first week in January.

^{25X1A}
[Redacted]
Executive Secretary
PSB Ad Hoc Panel "F"

*Working Group composed of:

^{25X1A}
Lieut. Col. Floyd Robinson, Department of Defense
Mr. Ernest Wiener, Department of State

25X1A [Redacted]

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Working Draft, Supp. No. 1
dated Dec. 18, 1952, to
PSB D-21, dtd Oct 9, 1952

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December 18, 1952

SUPPLEMENT No. 1 to
PSB D-21, Oct 9, 1952

WORKING DRAFT ONLY

A NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY

with respect to

BERLIN

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SECTION I

PROBLEM

To formulate a national psychological strategy with respect to Berlin.

SECTION II

APPLICABLE APPROVED POLICIES

As set forth in NSC 132/1.

SECTION III

A. Summary and Analysis

1. The city of Berlin is divided between the Western Sectors governed by a pro-Western city government working closely with the U.S., British, and French authorities, and the Eastern Sector, completely dominated by the Soviets and their German puppets.

2. As one of the free world's most exposed outposts, vulnerable to Soviet harassments of many kinds, and posing a constant challenge to

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Soviet efforts to consolidate their position and prestige in Eastern Germany, Berlin will continue to be a focal point of pressures and counter-pressures.

3. While ideally any planning for Berlin should take into account Soviet capabilities and intentions with respect to Berlin, both of these and particularly the latter, can be estimated only in general terms. As to the former, the Soviets are capable of making the Western Allies' position in Berlin untenable, either by the use of force or by restricting Western access to the city. A major assumption regarding Soviet intentions with respect to Berlin is that the Soviets will not deliberately provoke, or run a major risk of, war for the sake of Berlin. More tentatively, it is assumed that the Soviets will not impose another full blockade in view of: a) the failure of the last blockade, b) international political reactions obstructing broader Soviet aims, and c) a Soviet realization that such a course would stimulate western military programs and increase the danger of armed conflict. It is further assumed that the Soviets intend to make Berlin the capital of the German Democratic Republic, and eventually of a reunited, Soviet-dominated Germany as a major step in strengthening the Soviet sphere.

4. Present Soviet efforts with respect to Berlin may be designed to put the Western Allies under pressure, provoke us into war, or strengthen their position in the East Zone. In the process of isolating the Soviet Sector from the rest of the city, serious psychological and material effects, including significant interference with Berlin's communications with the West, seem highly possible. Meantime, petty harassments, such as barring Allied highway patrols and interfering with transportation, appear to be designed to probe Allied firmness and unity of purpose, and to undermine Allied prestige as well as to threaten our right of access.

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5. The present paper identifies general policy objectives and proposes a strategy adaptable to the following contingencies:

- a. Western access to Berlin is not seriously impeded;
- b. Serious harassing measures short of a full blockade are employed;
- c. A blockade or harassing measures tantamount to a surface blockade are imposed;
- d. The Western position has become or is about to become untenable;
- e. A Soviet or satellite attack on the Western forces in Berlin occurs.

B. West Berlin's situation. It is now estimated that West Berlin will continue to be:

1. useful as a base behind the Iron Curtain for propaganda, intelligence and other activities;
2. a symbol of Western strength and determination in the face of Soviet harassment and threat of aggressive tactics;
3. a symbol to the Germans - East and West - of the hope for the eventual re-unification of Germany in freedom;
4. vulnerable to, and subjected to, a continued Soviet and East-German campaign of encroachment and harassment which could have dangerous effects on the city's economic viability and morale, as well as discouraging and possibly divisive effects on the three Allied Powers, the German Federal Republic and the West Berlin authorities;
5. subject (despite being strongly pro-Western) to a certain amount of inter- and intra-party discord, special social problems, and occasional irritation with the Federal Republic and the Western Allies due in part to uncertainty concerning Berlin's future;

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6. in need of continued subsidization of its economy and moral support by the Western Allies and the Federal Republic; and

7. required by circumstances to have a special status, separate from the Federal Republic, and denied the degree of self-government which the Federal Republic is to have under the Contractual Agreements. (Despite this, ties between West Berlin and the Federal Republic will continue to be strengthened and West Berlin will in practice be given even more freedom of action by the U.S., French and U.K. authorities.

SECTION IV

OBJECTIVE

To maintain and reinforce our political, military, cultural, and psychological position in the Western Sectors of Berlin, in order to exploit that position in the furtherance of U.S. national interests.

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SECTION V

TASKS

(NOTE: In considering the following Tasks reference should be made to applicable portions of the General Guidance (especially Paras 1a ii and iii, Para 2, and Paras 4c, 4f i and ii, and 4h) contained in Section V of PSB D-21, dated October 9, 1952, and also to Part B of that Section, titled Capabilities.

Further, in prescribing this psychological strategy, the Panel has considered a number of actions which appear to support and contribute to the attainment of the psychological objectives. The list which follows is not necessarily all-inclusive or mandatory.)

Contingency A. Western access to Berlin is not seriously impeded.

Task One: To maintain and reinforce the U.S., U.K., and French position in the Western Sectors of Berlin and to deter and neutralize Soviet harassing tactics.

1. Convey to the Soviets US and Allied determination to remain in Berlin regardless of the consequences, thereby giving evidence of Western unity regarding the Western position in the city.

Action: STATE [REDACTED] 25X1C

Support: DEFENSE

2. By joint US, French and U.K. actions, demonstrate the futility of and grave risks associated with any Soviet tactics calculated to cause an Allied withdrawal from Berlin.

Action: STATE

Support: DEFENSE

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3. Make clear to all the world that the Western powers will hold the Soviet Union responsible for any communist actions against the Western position in Berlin.

Action: STATE

Support:

4. Intensify Soviet doubts as to the reliability of the GDR authorities, military forces, and population.

Action: STATE [REDACTED] 25X1C

Support: DEFENSE

5. Jointly with U.K. and French authorities, and as appropriate to situations created by Soviet actions, develop and discreetly publicize, within the limitations of security, Allied capabilities for retaliation against possible Soviet harassment measures.

Action: STATE [REDACTED]

Support: DEFENSE and MSA

6. Utilize all appropriate measures to encourage and support among the Governments and peoples of the free world, especially in Western Europe, diplomatic and other actions intended to foster continued interest in and a sense of responsibility for West Berlin.

25X1C

Action: STATE
[REDACTED]

7. Convince the West Berlin people that their own determination and faith are power factors affecting the

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whole world struggle between the Soviet complex and
the Western democracies.

Action: STATE

Support: [REDACTED] 25X1C

8. Mobilize free-world public opinion, especially in Western Europe, to confront the Soviet Union with a consolidated opposition to aggressive Soviet tactics which endanger world peace, and to support measures exposing Soviet actions.

Action: STATE

Support: DEFENSE

9. Assure the West Berlin authorities and population of the continued support of the free world by such actions as:
a) official statements, b) exchange of prominent personalities between Berlin and the West, c) international distinction awards to the people of the city, etc.

Action: STATE

Support: DEFENSE

10. Exploit to the fullest, by all available means, West Berlin's plight as evidence of Western strength, determination, and unity of purpose, and as a demonstration of the principle of collective security in action.

Action: STATE [REDACTED]

Support: DEFENSE and MSA

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11. Communicate to other parts of the free world a reflection of the resilience, courage, optimism, and anti-communist sentiment of the people of Berlin.

Action: STATE

Support:

12. Provide a counterbalance in West Berlin to the ill-effects of Soviet economic warfare against Berlin, especially so as to maintain and improve, by international action where possible, the standards-of-living in West Berlin.

Action: MSA

Support: STATE

Task Two: To utilize West Berlin as a means of strengthening the morale of the free-world and its determination to resist Soviet pressures and possible aggression.

1. Publicize Allied and Federal Republic aid measures and readiness to defend the city by informing the population of West Berlin of the measures taken in their behalf, and by giving ample recognition to their own achievements in restoring and maintaining their city.

Action: STATE

Support: DEFENSE

2. Jointly with the French and British authorities, prepare for publication when advisable a demarche, White Paper, or such other diplomatic communications as may be deemed

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advisable, designed to contrast the peaceful aims of Allied actions with respect to Berlin. with the unwarranted and hostile actions of the USSR.

Action: STATE

Support:

Task Three: To buttress the morale of the West Berliners and make it clear to them and to the rest of the world that a free Berlin is vital to the maintenance of free-world ideals.

1. Develop and exploit by all available means political, military, economic, and/or psychological programs of free-world support for West Berlin, especially those undertaken in consonance with existing collective security agreements.

Action: STATE ~~and~~ DEFENSE

Support: [REDACTED] MSA 25X1C

2. Make clear to all the world, by all possible means, including representation in the UN, that the Western powers regard the USSR as responsible for any communist actions against the Western position in Berlin.

25X1C

Action: STATE [REDACTED]

Support: DEFENSE and MSA

Contingency B. Serious harassment short of a full blockade.

Task: To consolidate the Western position in Berlin in the face of increased Soviet pressures.

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1. Intensify appropriate activities listed under Contingency
A.

Action: AS STATED

Support: AS STATED

2. Make evident the Allies' preparedness to cope with a
new blockade, including their potential for retaliation
and/or circumvention.

Action: STATE, DEFENSE, and MSA

25X1C

3. Utilize the crisis in West Berlin to accelerate and
intensify Western defense efforts and to strengthen
Western unity, with particular reference to the EDC and
Atlantic Community concepts.

Action: STATE and DEFENSE

Support: MSA

25X1C

4. Discreetly prepare the Berlin population for militant
resistance, should the necessity arise, against any
possible Soviet or Soviet-inspired actions; and display
to the West German and West Berlin populations Allied
military preparedness to resist any maneuvers by the
Soviet or East German military or para-military
organizations which would indicate that force is to be
applied to expel the Allies from Berlin.

Action: DEFENSE

Support:

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Contingency C. A blockade or harassing measures tantamount to a surface
blockade, are imposed.

Task: To gain international recognition of the Berlin situation
and of the aggressive nature of Soviet actions.

1. Intensify as appropriate tasks listed under Contingencies
A and B.

Action: AS STATED

Support: AS STATED

2. Stimulate support among member nations of the UN to consider
the "Berlin question" in that body, with particular reference
to the USSR's aggressive intentions.

Action: STATE

25X1C

3. Exploit by all available means throughout the free world
any joint approach by the US., British, and French diplomatic
representatives in Moscow to the appropriate Soviet
authorities concerning the severity of the situation in
Berlin.

Action: STATE

25X1C

4. Apply and exploit by all available means such retaliation
and circumvention measures as were planned under Contingency B.

Action: STATE, DEFENSE and MSA

25X1C

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Contingency D. The Western position has become or is about to become untenable.

Task: To lay the psychological groundwork for the possible use of military force in order to maintain our position in Berlin.

1. By agreement with British and French authorities, publish the joint diplomatic communication prepared under Contingency A.

Action: STATE

Support:

2. Stimulate free world support for any ultimatum to the USSR, which the US and its Allies will deliver in opposition to Soviet aggression.

Action: STATE

25X1C

Support: [REDACTED] DEFENSE

3. Employ all available psychological means to make clear to the world that we are determined to prevent outbreak of general war, and that whatever Western action may be taken in Berlin is to defend Berlin against Soviet aggression.

Action: STATE and DEFENSE

25X1C [REDACTED]

Contingency E. A Soviet attack on western forces in Berlin.

Task: To secure the support of all our Allies (including our friends in East Germany) for the Allied policy of armed resistance to Soviet aggression.

1. Intensify our efforts showing the USSR as responsible for

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precipitating hostilities which, if not checked, will develop into general war.

Action: STATE and DEFENSE

25X1C

2. Stimulate active support among member nations of NATO and the UN for Allied efforts to resist Soviet aggression in Berlin and to prevent, if possible, the spread of war.

Action: STATE and DEFENSE

25X1C

SECTION VI

ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS

The administrative provisions outlined in Section VI of PSB D-21, dated October 9, 1952, will prevail for the implementation of this strategy.

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